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In the S11preme Court
of the State of Utah

LOLLIN D. ORTON
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

WILLIAM BULLOCH ADAMS and
MRS. WILLIAM BULLOCH ADAMS,
his wife, J. V. ADAMS and MRS. J. V.
ADAMS, his wife, JOHN DOE, Administrator of the Estate of Robert M.
Adams, dcd., and MRS. ROBERT M.
ADAMS, widow of Robert M. Adams,
and DREX ADAMS and MRS. DREX
ADAMS, his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Because many of the statements and assertions set
forth by the respondents in their brief are without foundation in the record and many of which are directly
contrary to the record, the appellant challenges such
statements and is impelled to file this reply brief to set
the record straight in such particulars, and briefly to
comment on the items raised by the respondents in their
brief.
In the Statement of the Case and the Issues Involved, as set forth by the respondents, in Item 3 starting on
Page 2 and finishing on Page 3 of their brief, and the
next paraghaph on Page 3, referring to Orton vs. Adams,
et al.. 21 Utah 2d 245, 444 P2d 62, pertaining to this decision of the Utah Supreme Court where the holding is,
"The judgment is reversed insofar as it attempts to create a lien upon the real property, but is affirmed in all
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other respects," the respondents attempt to state th,,
the only thing in it was the money judgment. A mat ct
. d'icates that this was not the ure
.
rea d mg
of th'is case m
in.
of the Supreme Court whatsoever. The decision
is as follows:
"During his lifetime William B. Adams made
deeds of his property wherein he named his
children as the grantees of various parcels of
land. He did this in order to avoid probate costs
when he died. However, as the trial court found
he never delivered the deeds. The
obtained a judgment in tort against William B.
Adams on September 19, 1958, and the children
appellants herein, without authority from their'
father got possession of the deeds thereafter and
had them recorded."
This clearly shows that the Supreme Court as such
endorsed the finding of the trial court to the effect that
the deeds were not delivered and that the children, without authority got possession of the deeds and had them
recorded. Under these conditions, there is no way that
a later delivery can be enacted and made effective, and
there still has been no delivery of the deeds, and the
property is still the property of William B. Adams.
In the previous case of Orton vs. Adams, as quotea
above, a money judgment was rendered against William
B. Adams and against Mrs. \Villiam B. Adams. In addition, the case sought to impose a lien on certain property
on which the deeds had never been delivered to the
grantees. Bearing in mind that there had been a previous
judgment against said William B. Adams, and that the
second case cited in 21 Utah 2d was for reaffirmancc
of this judgment and to cause an entry of the lien on
the property, and was initiated a number of months before the eight years of the judgment lien on the former
case ran out. The Supreme Court of Utah in 21 Utah
2d found that the lien created by the original judgment
expired on September 19, 1966, and the new judgment
was not rendered until after that date, and where the
new judgment was rendered after the death of William
B. Adams, the judgment debtor that no lien was created
Page 2
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liwrcby. This is the reason that in 21 Utah 2d case the

·:ipic:mc Co ;rt of Utah reversed the judgment insofar as

·t at1empted to create a lien upon the real property,

.ind did nothing else to the trial court's decision. The
odginal lien had run out when the eight-year judg,1ent period was over. The second judgment was not
ckc tcd until after the death of William B. Adams,
1
dnJ unckr these conditions Mr. Orton became a creditor
his estate as a judgment creditor, and the Su1,n·me Court of .Utah f<;>und
lien
not
,lft·ctiH'. Except for this spec1f1c item, the trial courts
,iecision was affirmed in every matter by the Supreme
"'.ourt of Utah in 21 Utah 2d 245.
1

•

Counsel, in his brief, in the instant case, is attemptto tCJ.ke the position that regardless of delivery, the
,·1
can hold the property as against creditors
iii William B. Adams, even though there has never been
a dcii\ rry to them of the deeds. To give effect to couniwesent position, one cannot help but wonder what
. ·ounsel meant in the case of Givan vs. Lambeth in ApJkllant's brief, beginning with the last line on Page 43,
ily 1he same counsel, said case being 10 Utah 2d 287,
P2d 959. The exact quote out of the counsel's brief
'.11 Givan vs. Lambeth is:
"The conveyances bear date August 1, 1950. It

needs no citation of authority to sustain the legal principle that the deed is ineffective for any
purpose unless and until there is a delivery
thereof, In other words, the mere making of a
deed, while retained in the possession of the maker and with no present intention to deliver the
same, can certainly not be considered an effective instrument. In fact the defendants in this
case have made no such claims."

Howrver, in the case of Orton vs. Adams, even though
has been a finding by the trial court, affirmed by
the Utah Supreme Court, that the deeds had never
c1° 1ivered and that they were made for purposes
of Passing title on death, and that the children, with;i:,t u i1 i10rity from their father, got possession of the
th._·rcafter and had them recorded, all of which
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has been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Utah, in th,
predecessor case of the case now at bar, to-wit • Oi·tOi··
vs. Adams, 21 Utah 2d 245, counsel now takes the po.\;
tion that although the Supreme Court has found ther
has be.en no delivery, apparently it is not necessary an;
that simply recording of the deeds gives title and thar
it can be held against all comers, including credit%
of the person who owns the property.
The undersigned agrees with counsel that all thf
items in Orton vs. Adams in 21 Utah are res adjudicata
and that under these conditions it is res adjudicata tha
there has been no delivery, and that the deeds
were for purpose of avoiding probate were recordec
without authority. The question now before us is, unde1
these conditions, and with these findings by which l\t
are all bound, where are the creditors of William B
Adams to be paid? It is immaterial whether there are
more creditors than one or not. There is no denial thai r·
Mr. Orton is a judgment creditor of William B. Adams. ;

1

On Page 5 of respondent's brief, there appears to br
a complete mis-statement of a factual situation. It is
the belief of the undersigned that in the first paragraph
"The defendant then filed a motion for summary judg·
ment" counsel meant "The Plaintiff." Once again on
same page where counsel states, "The plaintiff has no:
filed an counter-affidavit or in any manner denied the ex·
press affirmations contained in said affidavit," this i>
not right. Continuing on the same page counsel states
"After the time had elapsed within which to file counter·
affidavits the defendants filed their motion for summan
judgment in accordance with the provisions of Rule
(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Ther
the last sentence on that page and onto the next page
it indicates, "However, the defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, and in support thereof se!
forth they would rely upon all pleadings in this cause.
transcripts and depositions in the preceding cases}:
tween the same parties, to-wit, Civil Nos. 3750 and 4v&i
This motion was not supported by affidavits in suppor'
thereof." It is the belief of the undersigned that counsel
· tha 1·
meant in his last statement to refer to the motion
Page 4
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rn;· plaintiff filed. An examination of the file shows
ihat the dates set forth on Page 5 are not correct. The
motion for summary judgment was dated
1,, 1cndant's
i.r Scp1crnbcr, 1970, and was noticed for argument on
_, (. :1th of October, 1970. Plaintiff's motion for summary
.11
iudgmc1it !·t'ferring to all the previous materials was
dated the 17th day of September, 1970, set down for
,,tgument, and noticed for argument at the same time,
iu-wit, the 5th day of October, 1970. It was sent for fil,ng on the 17th of September, 1970, and in all probability was filed on or about the 18th of September, 1970,
which would have been three days after the writing of
defendants' motion, and under these conditions, the
filing of the plaintiff's motion and the reference therein to all the previous proceedings put all the previous
proceedings in contradiction with defendants' affidavit.
the proceedings themselves were better than
nil affidavit. All an affidavit ever does is give effect to
counsel's opinions, as can readily be seen in this parlicular matter. Under these conditions, the defendants'
motion for summary judgment was contested by plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and it was less
than three days from the writing of the defendants' motion to the filing of plaintiff's motion. One cannot unrlerstand the fourth paragraph on Page 5 of respondt'nts' brief, "Plaintiff has not filed any counter-affidavit
or in any manner denied the express affirmations contoim·rl in said affidavit." Certainly everything filed in
contravention therewith contravented it, and certainly
the filing of the motion for summary judgment of the
plaintiff withi!1 a da''
or two denied it. It has always
.J
1
J'rn the opinion of the undersigned that Rule 56 does
require affidavits. Certainly everything in the prior
11"0
that had been decided was put into consid.
erat1on on both motions for summary judgment, and
th0 motion of plaintiff for summary judgment
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment
of the rlefendants and anything in support of plaintiff's
11
otion \\'as against the defendants' motion. Both items
''TP
for hearing on the 5th of October, 1970.
.\ho. tf<is is in view of the fact that on the 4th of Sen..
l:'
'.nib r J970, the Honorable James P. McCune made
11
' ordn denying defendants' motion for dismissal, orPage 5

dering that the matter be set for trial. These motior
for
summary judgment were both noticed for 5 O;t"
ber, 1970, and according to the memory of the undrr-:.,
ed then were argued and submitted to the
James P. McCune on that date, and were never decid
ed by Judge McCune. One is at a loss to understar
counsel's statement in the last full paragraph on Pa;:
5, "After the time had elapsed within which to file
ter-affidavits the defendants (plaintiff) filed their mi
tion for summary judgment in accordance with the pr,.
visions of Rule 56 (a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Cin
Procedure." Counsel now takes the position that ther
is no way to present a motion for summary judgmem
except by affidavit, or no way to deny same.
Bearing in mind that in all probability after thf
argument of this case, the next action of the plainUfi
will be to have execution issued against Mrs. William
B. Adams and sell her vested interest in the propert)
that she acquired upon the death of William B. Adams,
to pay the judgment against her, many of the ques·
tions herein may be becoming academic. However, w,.
still have counsel taking the position in the Givan case
that there can never be a satisfactory color of title with·
out delivery, and in this case taking the position that
although the Supreme Court has found that there is nr
delivery, there is a satisfactory color of title and the
property now belongs to the defendants. It is the beliet
of the undersigned that the statutes of limitation de
not run on any of these questions until there has beer,
a delivery, and that under these conditions defendant'
motion of summary judgment cannot be granted because there is no color of title on which to base an:
state of limitations. Plaintiff's authority for this is
pellant's brief in Givan vs. Lambeth as previously cited
Counsel takes the position that delivery of the deed>
is now moot because of the defendants' motion for sum·
mary judgment. This cannot be. Before the motion for
summary judgment can be considered, there has to be
a delivery of the deeds. Counsel in his brief on
in the instant case, goes to great lengths to show tha:
the Supreme Court of Utah did not see fit to elaborate
upon or specifically decide or make a finding on thf
question as to delivery of deeds. At the same time, Jus
1
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t_:J]ptt in his opening paragraph specifically affirms
1te.1i. and <.pecifically makes a finding that "the
. !iildren. appellants herein without authority from
ht:ir father got possession of the deeds thereafter and
:,ad them re('ordt'd.' The undersigned is unable to see
; ,1,1 an\ statute of limitations pertaining to real prop1
1,1
can i u11 until there has been a delivery of deeds.
L'p. to this point there is no color of title or indicia of
iiik, dS previously pressed by the present counsel.
It is the belief of the undersigned that the respondnts are now in the position of the respondents in the
1;ivan vs. Lambeth case, that there is not effective con, eyancc until there is an actual delivery with intent to
rransfer ownership. This can be found in Syllabuses 5
111d 6 of JusticE' Crockett's decision on Givan vs. Lamoeth, J0 Utah 2d 287, 351 P2d 959.
, ",
1
.
1

s
11

Under these conditions, there can be no statute of
limitations invoked on the instant case until there has
iieen a cleiivery of the deeds, inasmuch as the Utah
Supreme Court has held that the conveyances
are not effective for any purpose without delivery. Inmuch as it is quite clear that the deeds were for tes'amentary disposition and do not conform to the tes:.amentary requirements for disposition, and were not
drliver'.:d before death, the property is still the property
,_,r tht> decedent, William B. Adams, and is available for
(!'editors' claims against his estate. This is clearly substantiated in Slyyabuses 1 and 4 in the case of First
S1;curity Bank of Utah vs. Burgi 445, 251 P2d 297.
CONCLUSION

Appellant concludes that counsel for respondents
not set forth any good reason for sustaining the
udgrnent in lheir favor, and did not support their posi'ion with any relevant decisions and/or authorities:
ti1Jt lhe ji1.dgment of the trial court should be reversed
,,nrl the motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff
i:01,L 1> that t'1c entire matter should be remanded to
11
c
Court of Iron County, Utah, with instruc"0i1' t;) :;!low the motion for summary judgment of the
· ,;i;i, 1ff: inasmuch as there has been no delivery of
Page 7

i;au est ion.

deeds, there can be no release or color of title for any
purpose, including the statute of limitations, and the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah has previously en.
dorsed the finding of the trial court of Iron C.Ounty
Utah, that there has been no delivery of the deeds
question.
Respectfully submitted
PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for
Plaintiff and Appellant
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